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The objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of regulatory and environ-
mental conditions on technical eﬃciency of European railways. Using a panel data
set of 31 railway ﬁrms from 22 European countries from 1994 to 2005, a multi-
output distance function model, including regulatory and environmental factors, is
estimated using stochastic frontier analysis. The results obtained indicate positive
and negative eﬃciency eﬀects of diﬀerent regulatory reforms. Furthermore, estimat-
ing models with and without regulatory and environmental factors clearly indicates
that the omission of environmental factors, such as network density, substantially
changes parameter estimates and, hence, leads to biased estimation results.
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1 Introduction
Since the early 1990s, the European railway sector has undergone a major restructur-
ing and deregulation process. Arguments for the reforms have included the high subsidy
requirements and the falling market share of the sector compared to other modes of trans-
portation and the need for an eﬃcient integrated railway system throughout Europe to
facilitate open cross-border freight traﬃc within the single European market. In order
to promote competition and improve eﬃciency, the restructuring and deregulation pro-
cess has focused on market liberalization by granting non-discriminatory access to the
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1European railway network. The reforms have been concentrated primarily on separating
infrastructure management from transport operations and deﬁning and ensuring access
rights to the national railway markets by third parties.
The majority of European countries have implemented some kind of reform in the
railway sector, although these reforms diﬀer broadly in terms of their dates of implemen-
tation and their degrees. For example, Sweden restructured its railways in the mid-1980s,
whereas Italy did not open the sector until 1999. All European countries except Estonia
have separated infrastructure and transport operations accounting, and some countries,
like Germany and Italy, have implemented an organizational separation by establish-
ing subsidiary companies for infrastructure and transport operations within a holding
structure. The UK, Sweden and other countries went even further, creating a complete
institutional separation, with one ﬁrm owning the infrastructure and providing network
access to competitive transportation ﬁrms for transport operations. Finally, a few coun-
tries, including France and the Czech Republic, chose a mixed structure of organizational
and institutional separation by establishing separate entities but with strong monetary
and operational connections.
Considering regulation of access by third parties, the situation is even more complex.
While some countries have implemented access rights strictly according to the European
legislation, others have established separate national reforms, opening their rail freight
and rail passenger markets further for domestic and international railway undertakings.
For example, Sweden, the UK and Germany not only introduced open access arrangements
years in advance of the European legislation, but they also deﬁned more comprehensive
access rights than those stipulated by the EC Directives.
In addition to these regulatory factors, European railway ﬁrms are also inﬂuenced by
environmental factors such as population density, the economic situation and network
density. For example, in Spain, gross domestic product per capita in 2005 (measured in
year-2000 US dollars and using purchasing power parities) was nearly two times higher
than that of Poland. Expecting that higher income per capita increases demands for
freight as well as passenger transport, rail services in Spain should be positively inﬂuenced
by this environmental factor.
Several studies on the eﬃciency of European railways have been performed (for exam-
ple, Oum and Yu 1994, Cowie and Riddington 1996, Coelli and Perelman 2000, Cantos
and Maudos 2000, Cantos et al. 2002), but to our knowledge, only three focused on the
impact of European railway deregulation on rail eﬃciency since 1990.
In a 1999 paper Cantos et al. used a panel of 17 European state-owned railways cover-
ing the years 1970-95 to evaluate productivity changes in the European railway industry.
The results, which were obtained by using a non-parametric approach (data envelopment
analysis), indicated a signiﬁcant increase in eﬃciency, mainly based on technical progress
between 1985 and 1995. Further, when the study incorporated measures of autonomy
2and ﬁnancial independence from the government, the analysis showed higher eﬃciency
values and technical change for railway ﬁrms with a greater degree of governmental inde-
pendence.
A study on European railways by Friebel et al. (2005) investigated the impact of policy
reforms on 12 European national railway ﬁrms. Applying a production frontier model,
they compared passenger traﬃc eﬃciency for the period 1980-2003, during which most
of the European railway markets were reformed. The authors found that the gradual
implementation of reforms improved eﬃciency, whereas multiple reforms implemented
simultaneously had, at best, neutral eﬀects. Controlling for the eﬀect of separation, the
results revealed no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in eﬃciency between fully integrated companies
and organizationally separated ﬁrms.
Driessen et al. (2006) used a comparable data set of 13 European national railway
ﬁrms covering the years 1990-2001 to investigate the impact of competition on produc-
tive eﬃciency in European railways. The authors applied a two-stage data envelopment
analysis (DEA) approach, wherein the ﬁrst-stage DEA eﬃciency values were regressed
upon several country-speciﬁc institutional factors, including separation of infrastructure
from operations, third party access rights, competitive tendering and managerial inde-
pendence from the government. The results showed a positive inﬂuence on eﬃciency of
competitive tendering, a negative inﬂuence of third-party access rights and a negative
inﬂuence of managerial independence. No unambiguous eﬀect was found for the inﬂuence
of separation on eﬃciency. Driessen et al.’s results for third-party access and managerial
independence were in conﬂict with the ﬁndings of other studies (for example, Friebel et al.
2005, Gathon and Pestieau 1995); the authors suggested this diﬀerence may have been
caused by diﬀerences in the data, varying variable deﬁnitions or the estimation method-
ology used.
Overall, extant research on the impact of regulatory reforms on European railway
eﬃciency is rare and many of its ﬁndings remain ambiguous. Therefore, in order to
investigate the inﬂuence of regulatory conditions on the eﬃciency of European railways,
we apply stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and estimate technical eﬃciency of a sample
of railway companies from 22 European countries for the period 1994-2005. Specifying a
multi-output distance function panel model, including regulatory and other country- and
ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables, along with a time trend, we compare eﬃciency across countries
and changes in eﬃciency over time.
The outline for the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides an overview
on the European railway deregulation and presents theoretical foundations of the relation-
ship between eﬃciency and regulatory reforms. The methodology is discussed in Section 3.
Section 4 introduces the modeling approach and describes the data. Estimation results
are presented in Section 5. Section 6 summarizes, concludes and highlights directions for
further research.
32 European Railway Deregulation and Eﬃciency
Since the beginning of railway transport in Europe in the ﬁrst half of the 19th century,
railways have been regarded as an important strategic resource for military actions and
national economic development. Each European country established its own national
railway system without considering inter-country connections. Hence, until the beginning
of the European liberalization process in the early 1990s, the European railway sector
was characterized by state-owned monopoly railway companies without an integrated
cross-border railway system. Compared to other transportation modes, like road or in-
land waterways transport, this country-based system was not able to meet the increasing
transportation needs of a single European market, much less the transportation needs of
a world-wide trade system.
Table 1 shows the development of the modal split for passenger transport and freight
transport in the EU-15 countries from 1970 to 2000. Within the passenger transport
sector, passenger cars played by far the most important role. While from 1970 to 1995
the modal split for passenger cars increased by more than 8% from 73.4% to 79.5%, the
modal split for rail declined by more than 40%, from 10.4% to 6.2%. For buses and
coaches, as well as tram and metro, the modal split decreased by 32.8% and 42.1%,
respectively. In contrast, air passenger transport increased 187.5% in modal split. In
2000, the 5.8% modal split for air passenger transport nearly reached the modal split for
rail of 6.2%.
In the freight transport sector, the decrease in rail transport is even more signiﬁcant
than in the passenger transport sector. From 1970 to 1995, the modal split of rail transport
decreased by almost 58%, from 20.1% to 8.2%. Within the same period, the modal split
of the other two major players, road and sea transport, increased by 24.3% and 22.5%,
respectively. By 2000, these two forms of transport already provided transport equalling
more than 80% of the total freight transport.
Altogether, before liberalization began in the industry in the early 1990s, the modal
split for rail signiﬁcantly decreased for both the passenger and freight transport sector.
From 1995 to 2000, the development stabilized with no change in modal split for rail in
the passenger transport sector and only a slight decrease in modal split for rail (3.5%) in
the freight transport sector.
As a result of rail’s decreasing share of the transport market, the European Commission
adopted Directive 91/440/EEC in 1991 to deal with the development of the Community’s
railways. This was the beginning of the ongoing, step-by-step liberalization process in Eu-
ropean railways. Table 2 represents the regulatory framework and chronological sequence
in detail. The primary elements of the reforms have been:
￿ separation of infrastructure management from transport operations,
￿ implementation of interoperability among the national railway systems,
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1970 73.4 10.4 12.8 1.9 1.6 34.6 20.1 7.3 4.5 33.5
1980 75.9 8.4 11.8 1.4 2.5 36.3 14.6 5.3 4.3 39.4
1990 78.6 6.8 9.4 1.2 4.0 41.8 10.9 4.6 3.1 39.6
1995 79.5 6.2 8.6 1.1 4.6 43.0 8.5 4.4 3.1 41.0
2000 78.6 6.2 8.3 1.1 5.8 43.2 8.2 4.2 2.8 41.7
1970–1980 3.4 −19.2 −7.8 −26.3 56.3 4.9 −27.4 −27.4 −4.4 17.6
1980–1990 3.6 −19.0 −20.3 −14.3 60.0 15.2 −25.3 −13.2 −27.9 0.5
1990–1995 1.1 −8.8 −8.5 −8.3 15.0 2.9 −22.0 −4.3 0.0 3.5
1995–2000 −1.1 0.0 −3.5 0.0 26.1 0.2 −3.5 −4.5 −9.7 1.7
1970–1995 8.3 −40.4 −32.8 −42.1 187.5 24.3 −57.7 −39.7 −31.1 22.5
a Based on passenger-km for passenger transport and tonne-km for freight transport.
Source: European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport (2007, 2003).
￿ assurance of third party access to the infrastructure, and
￿ introduction of independent railway regulatory systems.
Overall, the intention of the reforms has been to provide transport operators non-
discriminatory access to the infrastructure and to enhance competition. More competition
is expected, in turn, to increase eﬃciency and demand for railway services.
However, the positive or negative impact of the individual reforms – particularly ver-
tical separation and institutional separation – on eﬃciency is not clear-cut. On one hand,
vertical separation promotes cost transparency, which prevents cross-subsidization and
reduces information asymmetries between infrastructure and transport operations (Di
Pietrantonio and Pelkmans 2004)), thereby reducing the potential for the infrastructure’s
management to discriminate against competitive transportation ﬁrms and enhancing com-
petition and eﬃciency. On the other hand, a potential loss of economies of scope between
infrastructure and transport operations could eliminate the beneﬁcial eﬀect of increasing
competition and could lead to decreased eﬃciency.
Third party access rights, expected to increase both competition and eﬃciency, may
also cause a loss of traﬃc density economies and an increase in coordination costs. This is
particularly true for the passenger transport sector, where economies from traﬃc density
are highly relevant and where detailed traﬃc coordination is needed for scheduled services.
Moreover, the impact on eﬃciency of access rights for international services relies on
the interoperability among the national railway systems; a low degree of interoperability
increases coordination costs and reduces eﬃciency. Thus, whether third party access
5rights increase or decrease railway eﬃciency depends on the relationship of coordination
costs to revenues from more competition (Di Pietrantonio and Pelkmans 2004).
Finally, the impact of regulatory reforms on eﬃciency relies on their enforcement. If
deregulation has an overall positive impact on eﬃciency, and if there is an independent
regulatory body to monitor the day-to-day implementation, the inﬂuence on eﬃciency
should be positive.
Irrespective of the regulatory reforms’ uncertain impact, eﬃciency may also be aﬀected
by environmental factors. The national railway systems in Europe vary broadly in size
and key activities, so a speciﬁc reform’s positive impact on eﬃciency in one country does
not necessarily point to the same impact in another country. Firm-speciﬁc and country-
speciﬁc inﬂuences on eﬃciency have to be considered.
For example, a primary factor characterizing railway networks is network density (net-
work length in km per square area km). The impact of network density on eﬃciency is not
necessarily clear. A higher network density could lead to a higher demand for railway ser-
vices – particularly passenger services – because of better accessibility and more transport
options, which would positively inﬂuence eﬃciency, but a higher network density could
also increase coordination and maintenance costs of the network, leading to a negative
impact on eﬃciency.
A second factor is the percentage of electriﬁed lines in the total network length, which
can be interpreted as a quality indicator. Compared to diesel traction, electric traction
permits higher train speed, which reduces journey time and increases train frequency. The
signiﬁcant increase in passenger numbers that generally occurs after electriﬁcation – the
so-called “sparks eﬀect” – suggests that electric trains are valued more than diesel trains
(e.g. Newman and Kenworthy 1999, Hensher et al. 1995). Thus, a greater percentage of
electriﬁed lines is likely to positively inﬂuence eﬃciency.
In order to control for varying income and population structures among the countries,
a cross-country eﬃciency analysis should also incorporated gross domestic product per
capita and population density. Since a higher income raises freight and passenger trans-
portation needs, gross domestic product per capita can be expected to have a positive
impact on eﬃciency. On ﬁrst glance, a similar impact could be assumed for a higher
population density, but considering the higher costs for passenger transport compared to
freight transport and a presumably higher amount of public-service obligations within a
populous country, population density might also have a negative impact on eﬃciency.
Finally, economic diﬀerences among Western and Eastern European countries and the
relatively short duration of EU membership among Eastern European countries (since
2004) should be accounted for as well. Assuming that Eastern European countries have
lower economic and technological development, they can be expected to have lower eﬃ-
ciency.
6Table 2: European Railway Deregulation
Date Description Content
07/1991 Directive 91/440/EEC on the
development of the Community’s railways
(transposition deadline 01/1993)
Management independence of railway
undertakings; accounting separation between
infrastructure management and transport
operations; improvement of the ﬁnancial
situation of railway undertakings; access to
the railway infrastructure for railway
undertakings providing international
combined goods transport and for
international groupings providing
international services between the states in
which they are establish (Article 10)
06/1995 Directive 95/18/EC on the licensing of
railway undertakings
(transposition deadline 06/1997)
Criteria applicable to the issue, renewal or
amendment of licences of railway
undertakings when they provide the services
referred to in Article 10 of Directive
91/440/EEC
Directive 95/19/EC on the allocation of
railway infrastructure capacity and the
charging of infrastructure fees
(transposition deadline 06/1997)
Principles and procedures to be applied with
regard to the allocation of railway
infrastructure capacity and the charging of
infrastructure fees for railway undertakings
when they provide the services referred to in
Article 10 of Directive 91/440/EEC
07/1996 Directive 96/48/EC on the
interoperability of the trans-European
high-speed rail system
(transposition deadline 04/1999)
Establishing the interoperability of the
trans-European high-speed rail system in
terms of its construction, design, service and
operation
First Railway Package
02/2001 Directive 2001/12/EC amending Directive
91/440/EEC
(transposition deadline 03/2003)
Extension of access rights to international
rail freight services on the Trans European
Rail Freight Network (TERFN); independent
organizational entities for transport
operations and infrastructure management
(organizational separation); assignment of
essential functions such as rail path
allocation, licensing and infrastructure
charging to bodies or ﬁrms that do not
themselves provide any rail transport
services; accounting separation between
passenger and freight transport services
Directive 2001/13/EC amending Directive
95/18/EC
(transposition deadline 03/2003)
Validity of licences throughout the whole EU;
notiﬁcation of the Commission of all issued
licences; requirement of a safety certiﬁcate
for the rolling stock and staﬀ for operators as
well as the attribution of train paths
7Table 2: continued
Date Description Content
Directive 2001/14/EC on the allocation of
railway infrastructure capacity and the
levying of charges for the use of railway
infrastructure and safety certiﬁcation
(replaced Directive 95/19/EC)
(transposition deadline 03/2003)
Framework for the allocation and charging of
capacity; publication of a network statement
by infrastructure managers with information
on the network, access conditions, capacity
allocation and tariﬀ structure; establishment
of independent regulatory bodies
03/2001 Directive 2001/16/EC on the
interoperability of the trans-European
conventional rail system
(transposition deadline 04/2003)
Establishing the interoperability of the
trans-European conventional rail system in
terms of its construction, design, operation
etc.; closely linked to Directive 96/48 EC
Second Railway Package
04/2004 Regulation (EC) No 881/2004
establishing a European Railway Agency
(Agency Regulation)
The agency´s primary task is to reinforce
safety and interoperability of railways
throughout Europe
Directive 2004/49/EC on safety on the
Community‘s railways and amending
Directive 95/18/EC and Directive
2001/14/EC
(transposition deadline 04/2005)
Common safety targets and common safety
methods throughout the Member states;
common principles for the management,
regulation and supervision of railway safety;
establishment of a safety authority and an
accident and incident investigating body in
every Member State (Railway Safety
Directive)
Directive 2004/50/EC amending Directive
96/48/EC and Directive 2001/16/EC
(transposition deadline 04/2005)
Conditions for the interoperability of the
trans-European high-speed rail system in
terms of the design, construction, placing in
service, upgrading, renewal, operation and
maintenance, as well as qualiﬁcations, health
and safety conditions of the staﬀ who
contribute to its operation
Directive 2004/51/EC amending Directive
91/440/EEC
(transposition deadline 12/2005)
Extension of access rights to international
rail freight services on the whole network as
from 01/2006; extension of access rights to all
kinds of rail freight services as from 01/2007
Third Railway Package
10/2007 Regulation (EC) No 1371/2007 on rail
passengers’ rights and obligations
Minimum quality standards for rail
passenger services
Directive 2007/58/EC amending Directive
91/440/EEC and Directive 2001/14/EC
(transposition deadline 06/2009)
Introduction of open access rights for
international rail passenger services as from
01/2010
Directive 2007/59/EC on the certiﬁcation
of train drivers operating locomotives and
trains on the railway system in the
Community
(transposition deadline 12/2009)
Introduction of a European train driver
license
Source: Holvard (2006), European Union (2007).
83 Methodology
To model the production technology of railway undertakings, we apply an input-oriented
distance function. Compared to other representations of technologies, such as cost or
revenue functions, the distance function approach has the advantage of permitting both
multiple inputs and multiple outputs. Further, it requires no speciﬁc behavior assumption,
such as cost minimization or proﬁt maximization which, in the case of the mainly state-
owned and highly regulated European railway industry, is likely to be violated (Coelli and
Perelman 2000).
Distance functions can be diﬀerentiated into those that are input-oriented and those
that are output-oriented. Depending on whether the input set or the output set is as-
sumed to be determined by exogenous factors, the output or the input orientation is
appropriate. In this study, the input-orientation is favored over an output-orientation be-
cause we assume that railway undertakings have a higher inﬂuence on the usage of inputs
compared to the outputs. This assumption is supported by the substantial proportion
of state-controlled public transport requirements within railway passenger transportation
and by the decreasing market share of rail transportation within both the passenger and
freight transport sector over the last decades (Coelli and Perelman 2000).1
By modeling a production technology as an input distance function, one can investigate
how much the input vector can be proportionally reduced holding the output vector ﬁxed.
Assuming that the technology satisﬁes the standard properties of economic theory (see,
e.g., F¨ are and Primont 1995) the distance function can be deﬁned as:
DI (x,y) = max{θ : (x/θ) ∈ L(y)}, (1)
where the input set L(y) represents the set of all input vectors x that can produce the
output vector y, and θ measures the proportional reduction of the input vector x . The
function is non-decreasing, linearly homogeneous and concave in x, and non-increasing
in y (Coelli et al. 2005). From x ∈ L(y) follows DI(x,y) ≥ 1. A value equal to unity
identiﬁes the respective ﬁrm as being fully eﬃcient and located on the frontier of the
input set. Values greater than unity belong to input sets above the frontier indicating
ineﬃcient ﬁrms.
To estimate the input distance function we adopt a translog (transcendental-logarith-
mic) function form. Unlike a Cobb-Douglas form, which assumes the same production
elasticities, the same scale elasticities, and a substitution elasticity equal to unity for all
ﬁrms, the translog does not impose such restrictions and, hence, is more ﬂexible (Coelli
et al. 2005).
1 Estimating both an input- and an output-oriented distance function for European railways, Coelli
and Perelman (2000) found similar results for both orientations and concluded that the choice of orien-
tation in this industry is not as important for eﬃciency measurement as it is in other industries.











































it is the input distance term; i = 1,2,...,I denotes ﬁrms; t = 1,2,...,T is a
time trend; xkit and ymit denote the k-th (k = 1,2,...,K) input quantity and m-th (m =
1,2,...,M) output quantity, respectively; and α,β,θ,φ and ψ are unknown parameters to
be estimated.
In accordance with economic theory the input distance function must be symmetric
and homogenous of degree +1 in inputs. Symmetry requires the restrictions
αmn = αnm, (m,n = 1,2,...,M) and βkl = βlk, (k,l = 1,2,...,K,), (3)









θkm = 0 and
K X
k=1
λkt = 0. (4)
In order to estimate technical eﬃciency and the inﬂuence of regulatory and environ-
mental conditions, we apply stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), a method simultaneously
introduced by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). SFA is a
parametric method which estimates a production function with a “composed error term”
that includes a standard error term vit, accounting for measurement errors and other
random factors, as well as a non-negative random error term uit, representing technical
ineﬃciency. Contrarily to models, which incorporate only one error term and, hence,
account ﬁrm-speciﬁc deviations from the best practice frontier to technical ineﬃciency
only, SFA decomposes the deviations into two parts: ﬁrm-speciﬁc technical ineﬃciency
and random noise.
10By imposing the restrictions above by normalizing the translog input distance function
by one of the inputs (Lovell et al. 1994) one can write the stochastic frontier production
model as



















































kit = (xkit/xKit). Replacing the distance term −lnDI
it with a composed error term
vit−uit yields a standard SFA distance function model. The standard random error term
vit is assumed to be distributed independent of uit as i.i.d.N(0,σ2
v). For the non-negative
technical ineﬃciency term uit, we assume a truncated normal distribution N+(µ,σ2
u), as
suggested by Stevenson (1980).
To investigate the inﬂuence of regulatory and environmental conditions on eﬃciency,
we follow the model speciﬁcation of Battese and Coelli (1995). This one-stage approach
provides more reliable predictors of ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬃciency than using a two-stage ap-
proach, which performs a second-stage regression of the ﬁrst-stage eﬃciency scores upon
certain environmental or other ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors. As noted by Kumbhakar et al. (1991)
and Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), the two-stage approach assumes the eﬃciency
scores to be distributed independently and identically in the ﬁrst-stage production fron-
tier estimation, while in the second-stage they are assumed to be a function of the en-
vironmental factors, suggesting they are not identically distributed. As a result, biased
eﬃciency predictors are obtained. The Battese and Coelli (1995) time-varying ineﬃciency
eﬀects model for panel data solves this problem by estimating both the frontier and the
ineﬃciency eﬀects in one stage.
Assuming that the environmental factors directly aﬀect technical eﬃciency, the ineﬃ-
ciency eﬀect model is speciﬁed as




where µit is the mean of the truncated normal distributed ineﬃciency term; zsit denotes
the s-th (s = 1,2,...,S) environmental or regulatory factor of the i-th ﬁrm in the t-th
time period expected to inﬂuence technical eﬃciency; and δ are unknown parameters to
be estimated.
11Since only it = vit−uit is observed, the technical eﬃciency of the i-th ﬁrm in the t-th
time period is predicted by the conditional expectation of exp(−uit), given the random
variable it (Coelli and Perelman 1999):



























where Φ(·) represents the distribution function of the standard normal random variable,
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The predicted eﬃciency scores range between zero and one. A score of one deﬁnes an
eﬃcient ﬁrm operating on the best-practice frontier, while a score lower than one repre-
sents the degree of a ﬁrm’s ineﬃciency. The γ-parameter corresponds to the estimated
contribution of the ineﬃciency term to the variance of the total error term. A value of
one indicates that all deviations from the best-practice frontier are due to ineﬃciency,
whereas a value of zero indicates that all deviations from the best-practice frontier are
due to noise. In the latter case using a standard estimation model (e.g. ordinary least
squared) would be appropriate.
4 The data and empirical model
The data set, presented in Table 3, consists of 31 railway ﬁrms from 22 European countries
observed over the period from 1994 to 2005 and was primarily taken from the railway
statistics published by the Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer (UIC) (2004, 2005,
2006, 2007). In addition, since the UIC data reveal inconsistent and incomplete time-series
for several countries, we also used other data sources, like companies’ annual reports and
in particular a data collection provided by NERA Economic Consulting. Within this data
collection, great eﬀort was made to ﬁll the gaps of the UIC data and secure consistent
and comparable time-series over time (National Economic Research Associates (NERA)
2004).
The sample includes the incumbent railway ﬁrms or their legal successors only. Some
countries separated the infrastructure from transport operations; thus, more than one
ﬁrm may be listed for these countries in Table 3. For example, in the Netherlands, the
infrastructure is managed by Prorail while freight and passenger transport is provided


















Austria ¨ OBB/SCHIG 53.0 29.8 5648 8233 15218
Belgium SNCB 40.9 24.2 3463 7606 7520
Czech Rep. SZDC/CD 88.3 68.8 9443 7249 18106
Denmark BD/DSB 15.1 5.4 2273 4979 1920
Finland RHK/VR 13.3 14.7 5839 3318 9708
France RFF/SNCF 176.2 137.3 30384 66807 48989
Germany DB 261.5 229.1 37579 71104 75820
Greece CH (OSE) 10.3 6.8 2426 1709 387
Hungary MAV 52.4 26.5 7720 7047 6936
Ireland CIE 5.4 2.3 1928 1467 482
Italy FS 114.7 86.0 16027 44766 22571
Latvia LDZ 17.2 10.9 2350 1012 13815
Lithuania LG 15.2 14.6 1882 749 9169
Luxembourg CFL 3.1 3.0 274 293 560
Netherlands Prorail/NS 26.6 9.5 2776 14524 3297
Poland PKP 188.0 139.2 21921 19564 55930
Portugal Refer/CP 11.7 5.9 2829 4091 2107
Slovenia SZ 9.1 7.2 1213 681 2731
Slovakia ZSSK/ZSR 47.7 34.4 3663 3145 11299
Spain Renfe 34.4 32.5 12460 17778 10907
Sweden BV/SJ 19.3 21.3 9811 6513 16193
Switzerland CFF 29.7 26.0 2981 12514 9134
Source: Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer (UIC) (2004, 2005, 2006), annual reports, company statistics.
by Nederlandse Spoorwegen (NS).2 For the purpose of comparison, observations for these
countries are generated by combining the data of the separated ﬁrms. Unfortunately, we
had to exclude the United Kingdom and Estonia from our analysis due to poor data.
Consequently, our sample altogether covers 21 of the EU-25 member states plus Switzer-
land. This creates an unbalanced panel, with the diﬀerence between 264 observations
having full data coverage and the lower number of 243 de facto observations resulting
from missing data.
2 In 2000, NS passenger and freight service were split into two entities, with Railion NL (a subsidiary
company of DB) taking over the freight service section. Due to missing data from Railion NL, our data
set does not include observations for the Netherlands since 2000. The same applies for Denmark and
Sweden since 2001, where the freight section was taken over by Railion DK (another subsidiary company
of DB) and GreenCargo, respectively.
13To estimate the multiple input and multiple output technology, we use three input
variables and two output variables. The number of employees (emp) (annual mean),
number of rolling stock (roll), and network length (net) (in km) are used as physical
measures for labor and capital input.3 Since revenues for passenger transport depend on
the number of passengers and the distance traveled, we measure the passenger service
output using the variable passenger-km (pkm). Accordingly, freight transport revenues
depend on the amount and distance of tonnes transported. Hence, we measure freight
transport services output by the variable freight tonne-km (tkm). As noted by Oum and
Yu (1994) these output measures, compared to other measures like passenger train-km and
freight train-km, also take the potential inﬂuence of government restrictions on allocation
into account.
The descriptive statistics in Table 3 show that our sample covers a wide range of
diﬀerent ﬁrm sizes as well as diﬀerent key aspects of activity. For example, the scale of
operations (measured in network length) of the biggest railway company in Europe, DB in
Germany, is more than 130 times as large as the scale of operations of the smallest railway
company, CFL in Luxembourg. Furthermore, especially railway ﬁrms operating in Eastern
Europe, such as LDZ in Latvia or LG in Lithuania, mainly provide freight transport
services while the relation between freight and passenger services in other countries - for
example, SNCB in Belgium - is close to equal. On the other hand, in Italy FS provides
almost twice as many passenger services as freight services.
We account for these diﬀerences by incorporating ﬁrm-speciﬁc and country-speciﬁc
environmental factors into our estimations. The variables network density (network length
in km per square area km) and electriﬁed (percentage of electriﬁed lines of the total
network length) characterize ﬁrm-speciﬁc diﬀerences that are considered to be outside
the control of the ﬁrm – at least in the short run. Similarly, the variables gross domestic
product per capita (measured in US-dollars of 2000 and purchasing power parities) and
population density (population per square area km) represent exogenous country-speciﬁc
conditions. Finally, the dummy variable East Europe accounts for diﬀerences among
Western and Eastern European countries.
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the environmental variables as well as an
overview of the regulatory variables used to measure the impact of regulatory conditions
on eﬃciency. As shown, we focus on three primary aspects of European railway deregu-
lation: vertical separation of infrastructure and operations, third party access rights and
3 Data on energy, another primary input of railway services, were not available. However, as stated
by Coelli and Perelman (1999), this should not be a serious problem for our estimation results as it can
be assumed that energy is closely related to rolling stock .
14independent regulation.4 Table 5 displays the year of regulatory change for each variable
and each country between 1994-2005.







NetDen Network density (10−1)
(network length in km/area km2)
0.6 0.3 0.2 1.2
Electriﬁed Percentage of electriﬁed lines
(electriﬁed lines in km/network length in km)
46.8 27.9 0.0 100
GDP Gross domestic product per capita (103)
(US-$ of 2000 and purchasing power parities)
21.3 8.9 5.7 53.6
PopDen Population density
(Population/area km2)
125.4 82.7 15.0 380.8




SepAcc Accounting Separation between infrastructure and transport operations (yes = 1)
SepOrg Organizational Separation between infrastructure and transport operations (yes = 1)
SepFull Institutional Separation between infrastructure and transport operations (yes = 1)
IntAccess Access rights for railway undertakings providing international combined goods trans-
port and for international groupings providing international services between the
states in which they are established (Directive 91/440/EEC) (yes = 1)
DomFreight Access rights for domestic railway undertakings providing rail freight services
(yes = 1)
DomPass Access rights for domestic railway undertakings providing rail passenger services
(yes = 1)
RegBody Independent regulatory body (yes = 1)
Source: Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer (UIC) (2004, 2005, 2006), annual reports, Heston et al. (2006).
Referring to vertical separation, we distinguish between accounting separation, or-
ganizational separation and institutional separation. As mentioned in the introduction,
several countries chose a mixed structure of organizational and institutional separation.
For example, in France two diﬀerent entities were created in 1997, with RFF owning
the infrastructure and SNCF providing the transport services. However, infrastructure
maintenance and some infrastructure enhancement are still managed by SNCF based on
a contract with RFF (National Economic Research Associates (NERA) 2004). Therefore
we do not consider an institutional (full) separation for France. In fact, such a mixed or
4 Other factors such as public versus private ownership, competitive tendering for regional passenger
services, or horizontal separation of freight and passenger services are not considered because of too low
cross-country and time variation in our sample.
15Table 5: Regulatory variables (1994–2005)
















Austria 1992 1997 1993 1998 1998 2000
Belgium 1991 2005 1998
Czech Rep. 1994 2003 1995 2000 2000 1995
Denmarka 1997 1997 1995 1999 1999
Finland 1995 1995 1998
France 1997 1997 1999
Germany 1994 1999 1994 1994 1994 1994
Greece 1999 1997
Hungarya 2003 1998b 2005
Ireland 1996 1997
Italy 1998 2000 1999 2000 2000
Latvia 1997 2005 1999 1998 1998 2002
Lithuania 2001 1997 1996 1996
Luxembourg 1995 1996
Netherlandsa 1996 1996 2002 1998 1998 2004
Poland 1998 2001 1998 2004 2004 2004
Portugal 1997 1997 1996 2004 1998
Slovenia 1999 2004 2003 2003
Slovakiaa 1994 2002 1997 1994 1994
Spain 1994 2005 1998 2005
Swedena 1988 1988 1995 1996 2004
Switzerland 1997 2000 2000 2000 2005
Source: Commission of the European Communities (2006), IBM (2004, 2006), Conway and Nicoletti (2006), NEA
(2005), Steer Davies Gleave (2004, 2005), National Economic Research Associates (NERA) (2004), European Conference
of Ministers of Transport (ECMT) (1998), European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport
(http://ec.europa.eu/transport/rail/countries/es/admin en.htm), various company websites, annual reports.
a incomplete time-series, b or earlier.
“hybrid” structure is more similar to an organizational separation with separated divi-
sions for infrastructure management and transport operations within a holding company,
as that which is in place in Germany or Italy. Similar arguments apply to Austria since
1997, the Czech Republic since 2003, and the Netherlands between 1996 and 2002. Hence,
despite the existence of separated entities we consider the railway sector in these countries
for these years as being organizational rather than institutional (fully) separated.
Third party access conditions are accounted for using three variables. The ﬁrst – inter-
national access – refers to access rights for international railway undertakings according
to Directive 91/440/EEC. Contrarily, the second and third access variables – domestic
freight and domestic passenger – refer to national legislation deﬁning access rights for
16domestic railway undertakings providing rail freight services and rail passenger services,
respectively.5
The last regulatory variable – regulatory body – points to the existence of independent
regulation within a country. The primary information source for this variable was an IBM
(2006) study, in which the authors identiﬁed three diﬀerent models of regulatory bodies:
the ministry model, the special regulatory model and the railway authority model.
In the ministry model, railway regulation responsibility lies within the Ministry of
Transport; no other standing organization deals with regulatory issues. We do not consider
this model as an independent regulatory body since the infrastructure – and, in most
countries, the main rail transport operator as well – is completely state-owned. In contrast,
within the special regulatory and railway authority models, either a traditional railway
authority or an independent regulatory authority is responsible for railway regulation
matters; thus, both models are regarded as independent regulatory bodies.
Inclusion of all described regulatory and ﬁrm- and country-speciﬁc environmental vari-
ables leads to the following ineﬃciency frontier model (Model I):6
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2 + ψ1t lnpkmt + ψ2t lntkmt
+λ1t ln(empit/netit) t + λ2t ln(rollit/netit) t + vit − uit
and,
µit = δ0 + δ1 NetDenit + δ2 Electrifiedit
+δ3 lnGDPit + δ4 lnPopDenit + δ5 Eastit
+δ6 SepAccit + δ7 SepOrgit + δ8 SepFullit (9)
+δ9 IntAccessit + δ10 DomFreightit + δ11 DomPassit
+δ12 RegBodyit + δ13Time.
5 Note that the year speciﬁcations of these variables listed in Table 5 refer to the ﬁrst complete year
in which the law was valid rather than the exact enactment date.
6 Note that the time variable is included in both the stochastic frontier and the ineﬃciency eﬀect
model: within the stochastic frontier it accounts for technological change while within the ineﬃciency
eﬀect model it accounts for changes in technical eﬃciency.
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As described in the methodology section (see Section 3), ﬁrm-speciﬁc technical ineﬃciency
represents the deviation of a ﬁrm from the best practice production frontier. Therefore, in
order to obtain accurate technical eﬃciency scores, it is crucial to estimate an appropriate
functional form of the production function underlying the frontier. Using the generalized
likelihood-ratio test, we evaluate several alternative speciﬁcations of our model. The test
statistic, λ, is deﬁned by
λ = −2[lnL(H0) − lnL(H1)], (10)
where L(H0) and L(H1) are the log-likelihood value of the restricted model under the null
hypothesis and the unrestricted model under the alternative hypothesis, respectively. If
the null hypothesis is true, then λ is approximately chi-squared distributed with degrees
of freedom equal to the number of parameters assumed to be zero in the null hypothesis.
The generalized likelihood-ratio tests for Model I are reported in Table 6.7 The ﬁrst
three null hypotheses refer to the parameters of the stochastic production frontier. All
three hypotheses – that the Cobb-Douglas functional form is an adequate representation
of the input distance function, that no technical change occurs, and that a Hicks neutral
technical change occurs – are strongly rejected by the data. Hence, the translog stochastic
production frontier with non-neutral technical change deﬁned by equation 8 is an adequate
representation of the data.
Null hypotheses four and ﬁve refer to the parameters of the technical ineﬃciency model
deﬁned by equation 9. Hypothesis four – that technical ineﬃciency eﬀects are absent
from the model – is strongly rejected by the data. Hence, a traditional regression model
(ordinary least squares), which accounts all deviations from the best-practice frontier to
random noise, is not a an adequate representation of the data. This is also conﬁrmed by
the estimated value of the variance parameter γ for Model I (see Table 7). The γ-value is
close to one, indicating that most of the deviations from the best-practice frontier are due
to technical ineﬃciencies rather than random noise. Since the estimated coeﬃcients δ3 ,
δ6, δ7 and δ8 are statistically insigniﬁcant in Model I, we test the ﬁfth null hypothesis: that
no joint eﬀect of the corresponding variables exists on ineﬃciency. Accepting this null
hypothesis conﬁrms that these variables do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect technical ineﬃciency
in Model I.
Altogether, the tests results demonstrate, that our model speciﬁcation of a translog in-
eﬃciency frontier model with non-neutral technical change is an adequate representation
of the data. However, the preferred form is given by omitting the variables gross domes-
tic product per capita, accounting separation, organizational separation, and institutional
separation. This model is denoted as Model II in Table 7.
7 All maximum likelihood estimates of the models are obtained by using the software package Fron-
tier 4.1 (Coelli 1996)










H0 : αmn = βkl = θkm = φtt = ψmt = λkt = 0 90.31 270.80 30.58 Reject H0
H0 : ψt = φtt = ψmt = λkt = 0 126.31 199.16 16.81 Reject H0
H0 : ψmt = λkt = 0 211.43 28.56 13.28 Reject H0
H0 : γ = δ0 = ... = δ12 = 0 84.00 283.42 28.46* Reject H0
H0 : δ3 = δ6 = δ7 = δ8 = 0 222.13 7.16 13.28 Accept H0
∗ The test statistic λ has a mixed chi-squared distribution for the hypothesis involving γ = 0. The critical value
is obtained from Table 1 in Kodde and Palm (1986).
The estimated coeﬃcients of the ﬁrst order terms and the time variable of the stochas-
tic frontier production function are reported in the upper part of Table 7.8 As all variables
are normalized by their sample means, the ﬁrst order coeﬃcients can be interpreted as
production elasticities for the sample average ﬁrm. Furthermore, the sum of the ﬁrst order
output elasticities equals scale elasticity, with an absolute value less than one indicating
increasing returns to scale and an absolute value higher than one indicating decreasing
returns to scale (F¨ are and Primont 1995).
All ﬁrst order coeﬃcients of the preferred Model II are statistically signiﬁcant and show
the expected signs. In other words, the estimated input distance function is decreasing in
outputs and increasing in inputs. The sum of the ﬁrst order output coeﬃcients (-0.930) is
less than one in absolute value, indicating increasing returns to scale at the average sample
ﬁrm, as observed in the majority of railway studies. Finally, the statistically signiﬁcant
and positive coeﬃcient of time (0.039) implies technological progress at a rate of 3.9%
per annum for the average sample ﬁrm.
The coeﬃcients of the ineﬃciency model are reported in the lower part of Table 7. For
Model II, all coeﬃcients except the coeﬃcient of the constant are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero at the 5% level. Among the estimates for the environmental variables, the
positive coeﬃcients δ1 and δ4 indicate that a higher network density as well as a higher
population density leads to lower technical eﬃciency. Moreover, the positive coeﬃcient
δ5 suggests a signiﬁcantly lower technical eﬃciency of railways in Eastern Europe than in
Western Europe. In contrast, the coeﬃcient δ2 is negative, which indicates that a higher
percentage of electriﬁed lines leads to greater technical eﬃciency.
Among the estimates for the regulatory variables the positive coeﬃcients δ9 and δ11
imply lower technical eﬃciency of railways in countries that established access rights for
international services according to Directive 91/440/EEC or access rights for domestic
8 Altogether, 15 out of the 21 coeﬃcients of Model I are statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 5%
level. As no straightforward interpretation of the distance function coeﬃcients exists and we are primarily
interested in the ineﬃciency eﬀects, we do not report all coeﬃcients to conserve space.
19Table 7: Parameter estimates
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Variable Parameter Coef. T-ratio Coef. T-ratio Coef. T-ratio Coef. T-ratio
Production frontier
Constant α0 0.204 8.68 0.216 8.74 0.237 10.76 0.128 3.67
lnpkm α1 -0.326 -12.53 -0.344 -13.88 -0.370 -16.03 -0.227 -8.17
lntkm α2 -0.606 -25.27 -0.586 -24.48 -0.571 -27.05 -0.642 -25.56
ln(emp/net) β1 0.352 4.33 0.352 4.11 0.157 1.84 0.490 5.83
ln(roll/net) β2 0.450 7.01 0.425 5.45 0.540 7.70 -0.009 -0.10
time φt 0.040 8.85 0.039 8.04 0.038 9.99 0.064 7.24
Ineﬃciency modela
Constant δ0 0.256 2.60 0.198 1.76 0.583 7.48 -1.031 -1.481
NetDen δ1 2.736 2.53 3.448 3.18 0.831 0.97
Electrified δ2 -0.817 -6.28 -0.920 -6.89 -1.260 -11.11
lnGDP δ3 0.099 0.88
lnPopDen δ4 0.314 5.94 0.324 5.94 0.440 9.96
East δ5 0.409 4.07 0.364 6.12 0.407 7.47
SepAcc δ6 -0.054 -0.97
SepOrg δ7 -0.080 -1.42
SepFull δ8 -0.074 -1.08
IntAccess δ9 0.201 3.89 0.204 3.71 1.205 1.91
DomFreight δ10 -0.258 -4.50 -0.253 -2.33 -0.024 -0.21
DomPass δ11 0.282 3.85 0.257 2.23 -0.201 -1.55
RegBody δ12 -0.231 -3.56 -0.255 -4.76 -0.052 -0.76
Time δ13 0.029 3.09 0.026 2.53 0.038 5.61 0.098 5.46
Sigma-squared σ2 0.021 6.42 0.021 6.67 0.029 7.98 0.055 4.35
Gamma γ 0.955 49.83 0.946 44.23 0.952 71.32 0.865 18.18
Log-likelihood LLF 225.71 222.13 194.80 120.73
Mean eﬃciency TE 0.794 0.797 0.786 0.819
a Note that a negative sign represents a negative eﬀect on ineﬃciency and, thus, a positive eﬀect on eﬃciency.
railways providing passenger services. In contrast, the negative coeﬃcients δ10 and δ12 in-
dicate greater technical eﬃciency of railways in countries where access rights for domestic
railways providing freight services are existent or where an independent regulatory body
is in place. Finally, the positive coeﬃcient δ13 points to a decrease in technical eﬃciency
over time.
Two alternative models are also reported in Table 7. Model III omits the regulatory
variables, whereas Model IV omits the ﬁrm- and country-speciﬁc environmental variables.
Compared to Model II, both models are rejected based on likelihood-ratio tests.9 Within
9 The test statistic λ equals 54.66 for Model III and 202.80 for Model IV. Both values are greater than
the critical value 13.28 (α = 0.01, degrees of freedom = 4).
20the production frontier estimates, the ﬁrst order coeﬃcient β1 of Model II is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 10 % level only. In Model IV the ﬁrst order coeﬃcient β2 is negative and
statistically insigniﬁcant. All other ﬁrst order coeﬃcients of the alternative models are
signiﬁcant and show the expected signs. Considering the coeﬃcients of the ineﬃciency
model, the alternative models lead to substantially diﬀerent results. Model III supports
the results of Model II. The omission of all regulatory variables only changes the statistical
signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient δ1 from signiﬁcant at the 1% level in Model II to insigniﬁcant
in Model III. In contrast, in Model IV, all coeﬃcients of the regulatory variables except δ9
are statistically insigniﬁcant. Furthermore, coeﬃcient δ11 shows a negative sign compared
to a positive sign in Model II. Altogether, these results support the assumption that an
analysis of the impact of regulatory reforms on rail eﬃciency without considering ﬁrm-
and country-speciﬁc environmental factors leads to biased estimation results.
Table 8 reports the average technical eﬃciency scores of Model II per country for the
period of 1994 to 2005 as well as for three sub-periods. Over the whole 12-year period,
the best results are achieved by BV/SJ in Sweden (98.3), RHK/VR in Finland (97.3),
and Renfe in Spain (96.4). Meanwhile, MAV in Hungary (46.4), SZDC/CD in the Czech
Republic (49.5), and ZSSK/ZSR in Slovakia (55.7) exhibit the worst results. Considering
the sub-periods, this ranking is quite stable – except for CFF in Switzerland and CH
in Greece taking over ﬁrst place and the third worst place in the 1998-2001 sub-period,
respectively.
Comparing the ﬁrst and last sub-periods indicates that technical eﬃciency decreases
for most of the ﬁrms. Only SZ in Slovenia (12.5%), ¨ OBB in Austria (6.2%), and Refer/CP
in Portugal (0.8%) exhibit a positive development over time. Among the Eastern Euro-
pean ﬁrms, LG in Lithuania, PKP in Poland, and SZDC/CD in the Czech Republic are
the worst hit, with a technical eﬃciency decline of 27.2%, 25.7%, and 24.7%, respectively.
Among the Western European ﬁrms, CFL in Luxembourg shows a 25.7%, CIE in Ireland
a 22.7%, and CH in Greece a 22.2% decline.
21Table 8: Model II: Technical eﬃciency scores
Average eﬃciency by period (in %)
Eﬃciency change
(in %)
Country Railway ﬁrms 1994-97 1998-01a 2002-05b All 1994-97 to 2002-05
Austria ¨ OBB/SCHIG 88.7 92.7 94.3 91.9 6.2
Belgium SNCB 79.1 69.1 65.0 71.1 -17.8
Czech Rep. SZDC/CD 58.4 46.1 44.0 49.5 -24.7
Denmark BD/DSB 78.8 85.2 81.6
Finland RHK/VR 98.0 96.7 97.3 97.3 -0.7
France RFF/SNCF 95.4 92.9 77.8 88.7 -18.4
Germany DB 83.9 84.6 83.5 84.0 -0.5
Greece CH (OSE) 89.0 52.3 69.2 70.2 -22.2
Hungary MAV 45.7 47.2 46.4
Ireland CIE 91.9 89.4 71.0 84.1 -22.7
Italy FS 84.7 73.5 70.2 76.1 -17.1
Latvia LDZ 89.5 73.2 79.4 80.7 -11.3
Lithuania LG 76.5 58.6 55.7 63.6 -27.2
Luxembourg CFL 97.2 93.7 72.2 87.7 -25.7
Netherlands Prorail/NS 96.3 94.3 95.7
Poland PKP 89.1 72.7 66.2 76.0 -25.7
Portugal Refer/CP 94.3 88.3 95.1 92.6 0.8
Slovakia ZSSK/ZSR 62.7 53.1 49.9 55.7 -20.4
Slovenia SZ 70.2 71.6 79.0 73.6 12.5
Spain Renfe 97.7 97.1 94.3 96.4 -3.5
Sweden BV/SJ 98.4 98.2 98.3
Switzerland CFF 94.9 98.4 92.9 95.4 -2.1
a Denmark 1998-00, Netherlands 1998-99, and Sweden 1998-00; b Slovakia 2002-04.
6 Summary and Conclusions
Based on a multiple-output distance function panel model, including ineﬃciency eﬀects,
we analyzed the impact of regulatory and other environmental factors on the technical
eﬃciency of 31 European railway ﬁrms from 22 European countries from 1994 to 2005.
Our results indicate positive and negative eﬀects of regulatory reforms as well as the
signiﬁcant inﬂuence of ﬁrm- and country-speciﬁc environmental factors.
Considering the analyzed environmental factors, we ﬁnd that the percentage of electri-
ﬁed lines positively aﬀects railways’ technical eﬃciency. A higher proportion of electriﬁed
lines can be seen as a quality factor suggesting a technically updated railway network,
with high-speed lines and a more eﬃcient coordination system than a non-electriﬁed rail-
way network. The estimated negative inﬂuence of population density and network density
can be explained by higher costs for passenger transport than for freight transport and
higher coordination and maintenance costs of a widely branched dense network compared
22to a less dense network. Hence, railway ﬁrms that concentrate on passenger transport
and those that operate a widely branched dense network exhibit lower technical eﬃciency
than railway ﬁrms that concentrate on freight transport or operate a less dense network.
Finally, we determined that ﬁrm location in Eastern Europe negatively inﬂuences techni-
cal eﬃciency, which can be due to a still lower economic and technological development
in these former communist countries.
Referring to regulatory reforms, the estimated results for third party access rights dif-
fer between passenger and freight transport as well as international and domestic services.
Access rights for international services according to Directive 91/440/EEC and those for
domestic railways providing passenger transport are found to negatively inﬂuence tech-
nical eﬃciency whereas access rights for domestic railways providing freight services are
found to positively inﬂuence technical eﬃciency. As our analysis is based on incumbent
railway ﬁrms only and every country observation includes the network, these results pro-
vide an indication for diﬀerent network coordination and management costs depending
on the kind of third party activity on the network. It can be assumed that the coordi-
nation of international cross-border traﬃc is costlier than the coordination of domestic
transport due to diﬀerent network or train technologies, diﬀerent languages, or diﬀerent
operational procedures among the countries. Thus, the negative impact on eﬃciency of
access rights for international services suggest a low degree of interoperability among the
national railway systems. Furthermore, regarding domestic transport, the results also
point to cost diﬀerences between freight and passenger traﬃc coordination. Passenger
transport provided by diﬀerent parties requires a ticket clearing system as well as an ad-
justed train schedule, which probably allows for less ﬂexibility than train scheduling for
freight transport.
However, another reason for the diﬀerent results could be the development of competi-
tion. Although in many countries competition in the freight transport sector has already
been taking place for several years, competition in the passenger transport sector remains
quite low in many countries. Hence, assuming that competition increases eﬃciency, the
estimated negative inﬂuence of access rights for railways providing passenger transport on
the technical eﬃciency of the incumbent ﬁrm could be a temporarily eﬀect, disappearing,
or even turning in the other direction, with more competition developing over time.
Finally, as the main function of an independent regulator body is to enforce regulatory
reforms and to secure competition, the estimated positive eﬀect on technical eﬃciency –
if an independent regulatory body is establish – meets our expectations.
Since none of the separation variables within our estimations reveal a statistically
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on technical eﬃciency, we cannot derive any conclusions on the eﬃ-
ciency impact of diﬀerent degrees of separation. This result conﬁrms the study by Friebel
et al. (2005), who noted that the estimation results on the eﬃciency impact of separa-
tion highly depend on how the countries are categorized. In addition, the statistically
23insigniﬁcant inﬂuence of GDP per capita was initially surprising. Normally, one would
expect higher income to increase passenger as well as freight transportation needs and,
hence, to positively inﬂuence technical eﬃciency. However, estimating a model without
the regional dummy for Eastern and Western Europe showed a statistically signiﬁcant
positive inﬂuence of GDP as well as of institutional separation on technical eﬃciency;
all other results remained unchanged. Therefore, we attribute both eﬀects to diﬀerences
between Eastern and Western Europe rather than to overall income or separation eﬀects.
Comparing the development of technical eﬃciency change (Table 8) with the regula-
tory variables (Table 5) reveals another interesting result. The three Western European
ﬁrms with the worst technical eﬃciency decreases over time (CFL, CIE, and CH) are the
only ones located in countries that implemented only two of the listed regulatory reforms
– namely, accounting separation and international access. This pattern indicates that,
despite single negative eﬀects of speciﬁc regulatory reforms on technical eﬃciency, none
or just one or two small reforms are even worse.
Overall, our estimation results from Model II together with the two alternative Models
III and IV, omitting either the regulatory variables or the ﬁrm- and country-speciﬁc
environmental variables, show that an analysis of regulatory factors within the European
railway industry should incorporate environmental factors as well. Otherwise, inadequate
results may be obtained.
Finally, some limitations of our study and aspects for further research should be noted
as well. Due to data problems, we were not able to include the United Kingdom or the
last years of Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden in our estimations. Since railway
deregulation in these countries is far advanced in several areas, it would be of great interest
to examine the development of these railway sectors compared to others. In addition, the
information on regulatory reforms used in this study rely primarily on the “law on the
books” rather than “law in action”. More detailed data are needed to account for country-
speciﬁc law implementation diﬀerences, especially for diﬀerences in the real day-to-day
practice. Finally, we incorporated only quantitative input and output data. Aspects of
railway safety, quality, and ﬁnancing are important issues to consider in future research.
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